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Employment protection and unemployment beneﬁts are consid-
ered as the most prominent insurance devices for workers to protect
themselves against the risk of unemployment. It occurs that societies
either choose a high level of employment protection relative to unem-
ployment beneﬁts or vice versa. This paper explains where countries
locate on this trade-oﬀ. It is argued that higher coverage of voters
out-of-the labor force with intra household transfers yields a politico-
economic equilibrium with relatively high employment protection and
relatively low unemployment beneﬁts. Cross country data is presented
that corroborates the outcomes of the model. While positive in nature
the ﬁndings bear high relevance for policymakers. They suggest that
‘ﬂexicurity’ policies might fail if their implementation does not ade-
quately address the causes of countries’ current institutional settings
- here family ties that express themselves in preferences over certain
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11 Introduction
A key characteristic of modern welfare states is the protection against the
risk of unemployment. Two devices are essential: unemployment beneﬁts
(UB) and employment protection legislation (EPL). Cross country evidence
suggests that there is a trade-oﬀ between those two insurance devices. Coun-
tries either have a relatively stringent EPL and relatively low unemployment
beneﬁt levels, or vice versa. This has, for example, been documented by Buti
et al. (1998) and Boeri et al. (2004).
In this paper I argue that where countries locate on this trade-oﬀ is
driven by the share of voters who are covered by within family transfers. In
particular, it is claimed that voters who are not attached to the labor market
but live in households that provide income transfers have a relatively stronger
preference for EPL versus unemployment beneﬁts. The reason is that the
former institution makes the job of the household member that provides the
transfers more secure, while unemployment beneﬁts are ﬁnanced via taxes
that reduce the net income of the household. Parties competing for oﬃce
make policy proposals taking appropriately into account the preferences of
the diﬀerent electoral groups. Thus, a larger group of voters out-of-the labor
force covered by household transfers increases the weight that parties attach
to their policy preferences. Consequently, a relatively more stringent EPL
will be the outcome of the electoral race.
Besides the positive analysis of the trade-oﬀ that the paper aims at, the
issue carries policy relevance. It is often argued that in a rapidly chang-
ing world unemployment beneﬁts is the superior insurance device to EPL as
it does not impede labor reallocation (Bertola and Boeri (2002)). Provid-
ing insurance while minimizing detrimental eﬀects on the eﬃcient allocation
of resources is much in the spirit of what has been coined the ‘ﬂexicurity’
approach to labor market institutions (see e.g. Wilthagen (1998) and Com-
mission (2003)). If, however, the combination of insurance modes are stable
politico-economic equilibria, reﬂecting preferences of voters as I argue, then
2institutional engineering is doomed to fail. While it might be desirable to
move along the trade-oﬀ based on some welfare criterium, it is not necessarily
the case that more unemployment beneﬁts in exchange for less EPL or vice
versa is a winning policy. Then, no such oﬀer will be made to the electorate
by competing parties that seek oﬃce.
There is a still small but growing literature on the political economy of
labor market institutions that, so far, has analyzed EPL and unemployment
beneﬁts separately. The political economy of unemployment insurance sys-
tems has been studied by Wright (1986), Saint-Paul (1996), DiTella and
MacCulloch (2002), Hassler et al. (2005), Neugart (2005) or Goerke et al.
(2006) among others. Politico economic analysis of EPL can be found in
Saint-Paul (2002) or Algan and Cahuc (2004).
As far as I can tell Boeri et al. (2004) and Algan and Cahuc (2006)
have made the only attempts to study the choice of the two modes of insur-
ance jointly up to now. The former propose two mechanisms explaining the
trade-oﬀ, one that recurs to the age composition of the electorate, and the
other to the skill composition. They show that a higher discount rate lets
unskilled insiders choose more EPL in exchange for lower unemployment ben-
eﬁts, which implies that societies with a more aged electorate will want less
unemployment beneﬁts but more EPL. Secondly, it is argued that cross coun-
try variation arises as the decisive voter may either be an unskilled insider
with a relatively high desire for EPL or an unskilled outsider with a relatively
high preference for unemployment beneﬁts. The latter see the choice of those
insurance devices rooted in the civic attitudes of voters. There, it is argued
that countries where civic attitudes imply cheating towards the government
provided transfers are less apt to implement such, then costly, schemes.
This paper adds an alternative but not necessarily competing explanation.
I argue that voters out-of-the labor force living in a household that receives
labor market income have a vital interest in the protection of the employed
household member who provides intra family transfers. Thus, countries in
3which the family is a major means of income source for voters not attached
to the labor market will ﬁnd themselves with relatively high levels of EPL.
Unemployment beneﬁts in those countries are relatively lower as beneﬁts have
to be ﬁnanced by taxes on labor income that reduce the employed voters’
and consequently the families’ net income.
There is a considerable body of evidence on family transfers (see the e.g.
Laitner (1997)) and also on labor supply decisions in the wake of those trans-
fers (see e.g. McElroy (1985) or Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993)). Not much
is known, however, on how family transfers possibly aﬀect the voting behav-
ior of individuals and thus the choice of institutions. It has been argued that
children who choose to live with their parents in order to circumvent credit
constraints by family transfers have a vested interest in their parent’s jobs
being protected (see Fogli (2000)). Brugiavini et al. (2003) show that young
individuals whose parents are retirees vote for a generous social security sys-
tem due to the intra-family transfers that they receive. To the best of my
knowledge, this paper is so far the only additional attempt to link family
transfers to a positive analysis of labor market institutions.
The following section lays out the labor market model and the political
decision mechanism, and presents the key results of the politico-economic
model. Section 4 provides evidence that supports the main propositions.
The last section concludes.
2 The model
2.1 The labor market
Initially voters are exogenously allocated to diﬀerent labor market states,
see also Figure 1. They can either be employed (E), unemployed (U), or
out-of-the labor force. A share ² of voters out-of-the labor force lives in a
household with an employed voter. This group is denoted with OF. The
4rest (1 ¡ ²) is assumed to be single.1 Initially no institutions are in place,
so that unemployed workers have zero income. At the beginning of period
t = 1 the electorate votes on two labor market institutions: the ﬂexibility
of the EPL (0 · f · 1) and the generosity of the UB which are payed as a
fraction (replacement rate) 0 · ± · 1 of the former wage for one period. At
the end of period t = 1 a ﬁrm might be hit by a shock. Workers are laid oﬀ
and unemployed workers may ﬁnd a job depending on the ﬂexibility f of the
employment protection legislation (EPL). Formally, a job goes sour at rate
s(f) with sf > 0. Furthermore, job protection legislation shall reduce the
number of vacancies posted so that the outﬂow rate from unemployment to
employment a(f) declines in less ﬂexible economies, af > 0.2
Employed voters receive a ﬁxed wage (w = 1), unemployed voters may
receive UB, and voters out-of-the labor force receive no income, unless they
live in a household with an employed voter. In this case they derive utility
from an intra-household public good that is provided by the bread-winner.
Quite commonly I model the transfer that a person out-of-the labor force
receives from an employed person with whom he shares the household as a
public good (see Bergstrom (1997)). Here, the idea is that the employed
household member derives utility from two goods, a private one (c) to which
he exclusively has access to, and a public good (y) from which every house-
hold member enjoys utility.3 The amount of the public good, and thus within
1Not allocating any voters who are out-of-the labor force to an unemployed simpliﬁes
the set-up. It does no harm to the main idea outlaid here. Namely, that those voters out-
of-the labor force receiving intra-household transfers twist policies in favor of the employed
voters’ interests. There is no change of the main driving mechanism to be expected because
typically employment rates are a lot larger than unemployment rates which is what is
approximated by initially allocating voters out-of-the labor force to employed households
only.
2Note, that for simplicity I postulate that the replacement rate does not have an inﬂu-
ence on the outﬂow rate from unemployment (a± = 0), even though one might argue that
search intensities of unemployed workers are a function of the insurance level. However,
empirical evidence suggests that it is rather the duration of unemployment beneﬁt pay-
ments than the replacement rate that matters for the transition probability to employment,
see e.g. Freeman (1998).
3Examples for the public good are shared living space, television or shared automobile
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Figure 1: Sequence of events
household transfers is a choice of the employed household member. He allo-
cates income (1 ¡ ¿t) between those two goods (both having a price of one




with 0 < ° < 1, given his budget and given the policies ± and f.
In each period the government runs a balanced budget. Out of his wage
income a worker has to pay a tax ¿t which ﬁnances the unemployment ben-
eﬁts. Thus, the budget constraint for the ﬁrst period writes
¿1e1 = ±u1; (2)
trips.
6where e is employment, u unemployment and the subscript denotes t = 1.
For the second period balancing the budget requires
e2¿2 = s(f)e1±; (3)
where the ﬁrst term on the left hand side is employment in period 2 which
is multiplied with the wage (w = 1) and the tax in period 2.4 As unemploy-
ment beneﬁts duration is limited to one period, all those workers who were
unemployed in the ﬁrst period and did not ﬁnd a job in the second period do
not receive unemployment beneﬁt payments anymore. Thus, what has to be
ﬁnanced by the unemployment beneﬁt system is the beneﬁt payments to the
workers who just lost their jobs. The number of inﬂows into unemployment
equals the inﬂow rate times employment in period 1. Solving equation (3)







I will proceed deriving the value functions for each state before introduc-
ing the political decision mechanism. At the time of voting each individual
assesses the consequences of the EPL and UB for its current and future well
being. Neglecting for simplicity discounting, the value equation for the four
4Employment in period 2 is given by e2 = (1 ¡ s(f))e1 + a(f)u1 taking into account
that s(f))e1 workers loose their jobs and a(f)u1 unemployed ﬁnd jobs. Clearly, the eﬀect
of a change of EPL on the employment rate is ambiguous which occurs to be backed by
empirical ﬁndings (OECD (2004)).


































1 = 0 + V
OS
2 : (7)
The employed voter allocates his income in equal shares to the private good
and the public good. At the end of the period after the shock hit, the
employed voter may loose his job with s(f) which yields utility V U
2 in the
second period or stay employed yielding utility V E
2 . The unemployed voter
also allocates his income which is the unemployment beneﬁts between the
private and the public good. At the end of period 1 the unemployed voter
ﬁnds a job at rate a(f) in which case he will enjoy V E
2 in the second period, or
stay unemployed which will yield him utility V
UL
2 of a long-term unemployed.
If a person who is not attached to the labor market lives in a household with
an employed voter he has access to the intra-household public good. As by
assumption those voters shall not enter employment or become eligible for
unemployment beneﬁts, their second period utility will be V
OF
2 for certain.
Those voters out-of-the labor force who do not live within households have
zero income.































2 = 0 (12)
In period 2 the employed pay taxes ¿2 so that their net income accrues to (1¡
¿2) which again is equally allocated to the private and public good. Beneﬁts
to the (short-term) unemployed are ±. The long-term unemployed shall have
zero income. The second period income from intra-household public goods
for the voter who is out-of-the labor force and lives in a household depends
on the status of the household member that was employed in period one but
might have lost his job at the end of period 1. Also in period 2 voters out-of-
the labor force not living in households receive zero income. Thus, utilities







































I turn to the political decision mechanism now.
92.2 The political sphere
I employ a probabilistic voting model (Lindbeck and Weibull (1987)). Two
oﬃce seeking parties P = A;B shall simultaneously make proposals for the
two policy variables EPL (fP) and the replacement rate (±P). The groups of
voters shall have identical ideologies ½ for the competing parties, uniformly
distributed with density Á and zero means. In addition there is an overall
ideological disposition denoted with ´ which is also distributed uniformly
and of mean zero, however with density Ã. A voter i of type J, with J =




iJ + ´; (13)
with qP being the vector over the two policies fP and ±P. The timing is such
that the two parties simultaneously make the policy proposals qA and qB at
the end of period zero. Then the uncertainty with respect to the ideological
dispositions of the voters is resolved. Elections are held and the winning
party implements its announced policy at the beginning of period 1.
Parties maximize their expected winning probability pP = P(¼P > 1=2),
where ¼P are the votes that party P receives taking as given the policy of
the competing party. The upshot of the probabilistic voting model is that
the parties maximize a weighted welfare function in order to derive a policy
proposal that gets them into oﬃce (see also Persson and Tabellini (2000)).
In short, they maximize a function W:
W = e1V
E
1 (qP) + u1V
U
1 (qP) + ²oV
OF
1 + (1 ¡ ²)oV
OS
1 (14)
with respect to the policies qP(±;f).
103 Results
Note, that the weights in equation (14) are independent from the choice of the
labor market market insurance devices due to the assumption that individuals
are allocated exogenously to the diﬀerent labor states in period 1 when the
vote takes place. The unemployment beneﬁts and EPL are determined by




































1 . As the utility of voters out-of-the labor force and not
living in a family is not aﬀected by the choice of insurance, only the marginal
costs and beneﬁts of the employed, unemployed and those out-of-the labor
force living in a household determine the winning labor market policy.
Inserting utilities and taking partial derivatives yields after rearranging
























2(1 ¡ ±M))1¡°) = 0:
(15)
The ﬁrst order condition consists of two terms. One which is weighted with
the share of the employed in period 1 and those living in a household with
them. The other carries the unemployment rate in period 1 as a weight. An
increase in the replacement rate decreases the utility of the former group
as a voter in this group has to ﬁnance it in period one and should he stay
employed also in period 2. In case he becomes unemployed he will proﬁt from
an increase in the replacement rate. An unemployed voter yields a marginal
11gain from an increase in the replacement rate in period 1 but should he ﬁnd
a job in period 2, he would have to carry the additional tax burden that
comes with an increase in the replacement rate. Empirically the average
duration of a job is larger than the average duration of an unemployment
spell (s ¿ a) so that an employed person and those living with them in a
household will demand less unemployment insurance than an unemployed
person. Thus, increasing the share of voters out-of-the labor force living in
a household (²) will yield a policy proposal by the competing parties with
lower unemployment beneﬁts given EPL.
Inserting the utility functions and taking partial derivatives yields the























2(1 ¡ M±))1¡°) = 0;
(16)
with K = dM=df. A more rigid economy has a positive eﬀect on the utility
of the employed and those out-of-the labor force living with them. They
oppose a more ﬂexible economy as it would raise the likelihood of a job loss
that would be accompanied by an income loss, given that income from work
is higher than unemployment beneﬁts. Suppose K ¸ 0 which is fulﬁlled
as long as the elasticity of employment in the second period with respect
to the inﬂow rate is smaller or equal to one (1 ¸ (de2=ds)(s=e2)).5 Then
those individuals would also suﬀer from a more ﬂexible economy because the
higher costs of the unemployment beneﬁt system would have to be covered
by a higher tax rate should they stay employed. If K · 0, the case where
more ﬂexibility reduces the tax burden in period 2, the tax eﬀect would have
the opposite sign. Turning to the marginal eﬀects for the unemployed, one
5As K = dM=df and M = s(e1=e2) the condition follows from rearranging dM=df =
(ds=df)(e1=e2) + s(¡e1(de2=df))=e2
2 ¸ 0.
12sees that a more ﬂexible economy raises the utility of the unemployed as it
increases the transition rate to employment. There is also a tax eﬀect for
the unemployed voter that he weighs with the likelihood of ﬁnding a job in
period 2. Should the tax burden be reduced by a more ﬂexible economy the
marginal eﬀect on the utility would be positive and vice versa.
A conﬂict of interest between the two groups arises in such a way that
the employed and those living with them in a household would always choose
a more rigid EPL than an unemployed voter if K is suﬃciently small in
absolute terms. The intuition is the following: Assume K was positive then
a more ﬂexible economy increases the tax burden in the second period. This
would generate the eﬀect that an employed voter would rather have a more
rigid economy. The unemployed voter will prefer to have a more ﬂexible
economy as long as the tax eﬀect is suﬃciently small. If the tax eﬀect was
not suﬃciently small there would be no point for him in making the economy
more ﬂexible in order to raise the likelihood of a transition to employment
because income would be taxed away in the second period. If K is negative,
then the unemployed voter will want a fully ﬂexible economy. The employed
voter and his household member not being in the labor force will choose
rigidity if K is suﬃciently small in absolute terms. If it was not, a more
ﬂexible economy would reduce the tax burden in the second period so heavily
that even an employed voter would want a more ﬂexible economy. Thus, for
K being suﬃciently small in absolute terms the optimal choice of the political
parties will be such that more EPL will arise as the ratio of voters out-of-the
labor force receiving transfers (²) increases, given any level of unemployment
beneﬁts.
The slopes of the ﬁrst order conditions on unemployment beneﬁts and
EPL are ambiguous. However, that the comparative statics of the model
yield higher EPL levels relative to unemployment beneﬁts as the share of
voters out-of-the labor force living in households increases can be supported
13by numerical examples.6 For that exercise the inﬂow and outﬂow rates have
been speciﬁed as s = c+bf¯ and a = d+hf® with c;b;¯;d;h;® > 0. Figure
2 shows the ﬁrst order conditions for ² = 0 (solid line – no coverage of those
out-of-the labor force with household transfers) and ² = 1 (dashed line).
As the share of voters out-of-the labor force living in a household with an
employed increases, unemployment beneﬁts decrease and EPL becomes more
stringent.
Note, that the parameters which were chosen for the inﬂow and outﬂow
rates yield reasonable values for the endogenous variables. Take the case
where there is full coverage of voters out-of-the labor force by household
transfer (² = 1). With a quarterly calibration and a ¼ 0:5 average dura-
tion of unemployment is about half a year and the average duration of a job
is approximately ﬁve years (s ¼ 0:05). The unemployment rate deﬁned as
unemployed divided by the sum of unemployed and employed in the second
period of production is u2 ¼ 0:09. Remember that the share of voters out-
of-the labor force in the numerical example is o = 0:3. Thus the employment
rate deﬁned as the employed divided by the whole population becomes ap-
proximately 0.7. Note also, that the main result of the baseline numerical
example in ﬁgure 2 is robust against changes in the parameters for the in-
ﬂow and outﬂow rates as well as the parameter of the preference function.
Changes of the parameters values of §20% with respect to the baseline ex-
ample still yield a trade-oﬀ between the insurance devices driven by family
transfers.
4 Evidence
Figure 3 plots a measure of the trade-oﬀ of the two insurance devices against
an indicator that captures the role of households as a means of an income
6For the numerical example that follows I veriﬁed the second order conditions for
a maximum. A formal proof of the main proposition, namely that variation in within
household transfers yield the trade-oﬀ can be found in Neugart (2007).








Figure 2: Politico-economic equilibria; c = 0:05;b = 0:05;¯ = 2;® = 1;d =
0:5;h = 0:1;o = 0:3 and ° = 0:5; dashed line represents case in which ² = 1;
solid line represents case in which ² = 0.
source. The vertical axis is the ratio of the replacement rate and the OECD
index for the strictness of EPL.7 Thus, higher values indicate that in those
countries there is more unemployment beneﬁt provision relative to EPL. The
variable on the horizontal axis is the ratio of the inactivity rate among indi-
viduals and the non-employment rate among households (see OECD (2001))
which approximates for the role households may play in providing insurance
to inactive individuals. Why that? Suppose for the moment that all coun-
tries had the same inactivity rate. Then for those individuals out-of-the
labor force, households may play a diﬀerent role in providing transfers if the
proposed ratio varies across countries. With a higher non-employment rate
7The net replacement rate indicator stems from the OECD, Beneﬁts and Wages and is
the average for four family types, over a ﬁve-year period and two earnings levels in 2002
(OECD (2004a), Table 3.3b)). The EPL indicator can be found in OECD (2004b), Table
2, A 2.4, Version 2.
15of households, one would expect that within family transfers play a smaller
role as families with at least one member being employed are less likely to
be found. Thus, lower ratios of inactivity of individuals to non-employment
rates of households should imply that in those countries the household plays
a smaller role in providing insurance to inactive individuals.
The indicator for the trade-oﬀ draws on data from 2002 and 2003 for
beneﬁts and EPL, respectively, and the indicator that refers to which extent
households provide a means of insurance is from the year 1996. This is done
to account for possible endogeneity of the market outcome. With a time
lag on the inactivity and non-employment rates among households it is more
stringent to argue that market outcomes cause institutional choices.8 The
negative correlation – the correlation coeﬃcient is -0.51 – shows that those
countries in which the household is less of a means for transferring income
also have higher unemployment beneﬁts relative to EPL.
Former empirical work on labor market institutions has used other vari-
ables to explain unemployment insurance provision (but not the mix of in-
surance devices.) In a regression model (see table 1) I take into account
other potential explanations of the trade-oﬀ between the two insurance de-
vices. For example, Agell (2002) included variables measuring the size of
the population and the openness of countries. Country size may matter if
there are economies of scale such as ﬁxed costs to the creation of institutions,
which could arise when a workable administrative system of unemployment
beneﬁt compensations has to be established ﬁrst (see Alesina and Wacziarg
(1998)). Such a line of reasoning could apply in our case if costs for in-
stalling one over the other institution diﬀer. The justiﬁcation to include an
openness variable in the regression may be that workers in countries that
are more exposed to the world market may face a larger risk of becoming
unemployed. Therefore, as was argued, citizens in those countries may opt
8One may want to introduce a larger lag given the conjecture that institutional change
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Figure 3: Modes of insurance in the labor market in 2002 over inactivity rate
divided by risk of non-employment among households in 1996.
for larger governments as an insurance device (see Rodrik (1998)). In our
case, voters might opt for a mix of insurance devices that is more adaptable
to the needs of a changing world economy. Unemployment insurance over job
protection could be preferred as the latter would slow down the reallocation
of resources slowing down growth. As ﬁgure 3 shows a clustering of coun-
tries from southern Europe with lower GDP per capita, a control for income
might also be of interest. Finally, I controlled for the skill composition with
a variable measuring the share of workers with a lower secondary education
in the population aged 15 to 64.
I ran regressions of the measure of the insurance mix on the ratio of
the inactivity rate over the non-employment rate among households control-
ling sequentially for openness, GDP per capita, size of countries, and the
skill composition.9 Contrary to the ratio of the inactivity rate to the non-
9The control variables are also for the year 1996, except for the variable measuring
the skill composition which refers to the year 1999 due to an insuﬃcient number of
17Table 1: OLS regressions on modes of insurance
Dependent variable:
Ratio of replacement rate over EPL indicator in year 2002
Variable Coeﬀ. Coeﬀ. Coeﬀ. Coeﬀ. Coeﬀ.
Constant 66.13*** 59.27*** 49.67* 65.55*** 68.09***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.069) (0.000) (0.000)
Inact. rate/Risk non-emp. households 1996 -20.95** -20.42** -17.26* -20.85** -18.08*
(0.019) (0.022) (0.089) (0.023) (0.053)
Openness 1996 0.09
(0.319)
GDP per capita 1996 0.00
(0.465)
Population size 1996 0.00
(0.834)
Skill composition 1999 -0.36
(0.409)
N 21 21 21 21 20
adj. R2 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.18 0.18
Note: p-values are in (). ¤ ¤ ¤, ¤¤, ¤ denote signiﬁcance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%,
respectively.
employment rate among households none of the controls was signiﬁcant, see
table 1. Altogether, those unsophisticated OLS regressions support the ar-
gument that the choice of insurance devices in the labor market is a function
of whether the family serves as an alternative insurance device.10
5 Conclusions
In a cross country perspective modes of insurance in the labor market dif-
fer. There occurs to be a robust trade-oﬀ between EPL and unemployment
insurance, such that countries show either a relatively high level of EPL and
low beneﬁt levels or vice versa. I argued that where countries locate on this
trade-oﬀ can be explained by the variation in intra-household transfers to
observations for the earlier year. The data on the skill composition can be found at:
http://www1.oecd.org/scripts/cde/members/lfsindicatorsAuthenticate.asp, all other con-
trols are taken from Penn World Data.
10In Neugart (2007) survey data is analyzed. The ﬁndings support the conﬂict of interest
between diﬀerent electoral groups which is in the approach presented here essential for the
trade-oﬀ between unemployment insurance and employment protection.
18those voters who are out-of-the labor force. The driving force is that voters
who are not attached to the labor market but live in households with em-
ployed workers have a preference for more EPL relative to unemployment
insurance which competing parties take into account when making policy
proposals. Voters not attached to the labor market but living in a household
have a vested interest in protecting the job of the employed household mem-
ber out of which the intra-household transfers are paid given unemployment
beneﬁt levels. Given job protection, voters who are out-of-the labor force and
covered by household transfers want relatively little unemployment beneﬁts
as a more generous unemployment beneﬁt system would lower the transfers
they receive from the employed household member. The explanation of the
insurance mix in the labor market through variation in the household cov-
erage of voters out-of-the labor force ﬁnds support in cross country data.
For policy makers the ﬁndings suggest that electoral support for ‘ﬂexicu-
rity’ policies will only be achieved when family ties that express themselves
in preferences over certain welfare state arrangements are adequately taken
into account.
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